Skip to main content
reliquary-tc maintains a Prometheus catalog of 36 counters, 4 histograms, 19 gauges. The recorder is always live so the get_metrics tool and the optional /metrics scrape endpoint share the same in-memory state. Every catalog name below is registered so /metrics is catalog-complete even before a metric has live traffic to report.

Counters

Histograms

Gauges

Labels are deliberately low-cardinality — vault and scope_class, never raw tool arguments or per-caller hashes — so the series count stays bounded.

The /metrics endpoint

Disabled by default. When observability.prometheus.enabled is set, a small HTTP listener serves /metrics on prometheus.bind:port. Authentication follows auth.mode, not the bind address:
  • auth.mode: jwt or oidc → a verified bearer that holds the admin:metrics scope and is not bound to a vault or persona is required on every bind, loopback included. A loopback bind cannot tell a local scraper from a caller that a Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale Serve, an SSH reverse forward or a reverse proxy relayed to 127.0.0.1, so it is not trusted as “local”;
  • auth.mode: none, loopback bind → open, no token needed (the single-user local default);
  • auth.mode: none, non-loopback bind → refused at startup.
The token is verified by the same verifier instance the MCP HTTP transport uses, built once at boot (every key source: jwtSecret, jwks, jwksFile, jwksUri, registry keys; the same audience, issuer, algorithms and requireJti; or the OIDC provider under auth.mode: oidc). A token the MCP edge accepts is verified identically here. On a loopback bind the Host header is also checked with the MCP route’s DNS-rebinding guard (transports.http.enableDnsRebindingProtection, on by default): a request whose Host is not loopback, the bind host, or listed in transports.http.allowedHosts is refused with 403, before authentication. If a tunnel or reverse proxy fronts the listener, add the public host name it forwards (for example metrics.example.com) to transports.http.allowedHosts, and give the scraper behind it an admin:metrics token, exactly as for a direct remote scrape. The responses (when authentication is required) are: admin:metrics is the scope the get_metrics tool already requires, and it is matched the same way: *, admin:* and admin grant it; read:* and other admin: scopes do not. Under auth.mode: oidc the scope has to come out of your claimMapping / scopeMap like any other. Every series on this endpoint is process-wide and is computed without a per-caller ACL (queue depths, call counts and ACL-denial counts for every vault), so the scope is the authorization and there is no per-vault filtering: a token bound to one vault is refused rather than shown a subset. For a per-vault view use the get_metrics tool, which pins a vault-bound caller to its own vault. Breaking for existing scrapers under jwt / oidc. Before this change any verified token could scrape a non-loopback bind (including one minted with --scopes ""), and a loopback bind needed no token at all. Mint a dedicated scrape token and update the scraper, loopback or not: